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Rhetoric and Phenomenology 
of Art 
Notes towards an 
understanding of rhetoric 
Paolo Bagni 
1. Within the context of a necessary investigation of the elements 
which go to make up the contemporary understanding of rhetoric, 
I wish to draw attention to what may be called the "the phenome-
nology of art," a methodological approach which, whilst neither 
springing exclusively from the field of rhetorical studies in the 
strictest sense, nor exclusively concerned with rhetorical ideas, 
has nonetheless given rise to an approach which is extremely 
significant for rhetoric and which has produced some important 
critical studies. 1 I am using "phenomenology of art" here to refer 
to that line of aesthetic reflection which finds its point of focus in 
the thought of Luciano Anceschi, with respect to the ideas of 
poetics [poetica] and "institutions of poetry" [istituzioni della poesia], 
and which has its theoretical basis in the philosophy of Antonio 
Banfi and his rejection of a single-level reflection of art in favor 
of a multiple-mode aesthetics carried out within an open organi-
zation of knowledge. 2 
Where does the point of contact lie between an insistently 
philosophical aesthetics and rhetoric? A passage from Banfi makes 
the connection clear. In his introduction to a translation of Lon-
[Translated from the Italian by Christine Richardson] 
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ginus' On the Sublime, published in 1949, we find the following 
indications: 
Romantic art and modern and contemporary art in general admits 
and even appreciates the irregularity of its subjective effects as a 
proof of its full expansive capacity. In this way it justifies the fact of 
being able to be considered as a simple opportunity for causing such 
an imaginative and emotional development. Ancient art, because 
of its origins and of the ethical and social function which it exercised, 
was more concerned with controlling, guiding and coordinating 
these effects and for this reason it has a principally oratorical inten-
tionality. As a result, the principles and rules of rhetoric have a 
double meaning in ancient literature. On the one hand, they indi-
cate the formative structure of the reality of art in its independence 
of existential reality from which it nonetheless draws its worth as 
an imitation and idealization. On the other hand, these rules control 
the emotional and imaginative after-life of art as they create, one 
might say, art's definitive horizon as not only aesthetic principles 
but as hedonistic or moral principles. [ ... ] 
The development of classical rhetoric thus offers a valuable 
field of analysis for the phenomenology of art and for the clarification 
of the complex structure which lies at the base both of the aesthetic 
independence and the human effectiveness of ancient art and which 
thus determines the typical idealizing nature of art. The ease with 
which the subjective aesthetics of lyricism and of intuition has elimi-
nated rhetoric and dismissed it as an empty product of classification 
and intellectualistic analysis is an effect of the special nature of 
modern art, particularly in its romantic manifestations. In truth, it 
is only through the study of the system of rhetoric that the creation 
and value of ancient art is understandable and appreciable and that 
the lines of continuity in its historical development may be dis-
cerned. It is only through the function of rhetoric that the bounds 
and connections of the various directions of reflection on art can 
become clear. 3 
Prior to the experience of modern art, rhetoric seems to be a 
"definitive horizon" and "the formative structure of the reality of 
art." This is a definition which seems at first sight to fall within 
an opposition between ancient and modern art. While such an 
opposition is quite permissible in a critical perspective, it is by no 
means satisfactory in a theoretical perspective. However, the "an-
cient"/"modern" theme plays another, far more decisive role in 
this passage: indeed, the overshadowing of rhetoric-"The ease 
with which the subjective aesthetics of lyricism and of intuition 
has eliminated rhetoric" -is an effect of modern art, an effect of 
"the special nature of modern art." 
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Here we can see that a precise distortion has been effected 
on rhetoric by modern thought. The devaluation of rhetoric is not 
a natural effect of the modern on the ancient but rather an intended 
and particular denial of the reality of art. 
2. It would be easy to trace in Banfi' s formula "subjective aesthetics 
of lyricism and of intuition" a veiled allusion to Benedetto Croce. 
While not denying Banfi' s strong opposition to Croce's 
philosophy, I shall turn aside, at least for the moment, from the 
duel with Croce in order to step back a little from the formulae 
and histrionic gestures of "denial" and "ransoming" of rhetoric 
and try to follow the development and use of certain motifs and 
meanings which are important to the idea of rhetoric. In this way, 
I shall attempt to demonstrate the specific sense of the connection 
between rhetoric and phenomenology of art which I use in my title. 
Significant elements for our analysis may be found in the 
second half of the nineteenth century against the background of 
Croce's philosophical obliteration of rhetoric. Herbert Spencer's 
"Philosophy of Style" (1852) presents a good positivist example 
of the naturalization of rhetoric . Spencer's argument is characteris-
tically neat and to the point. Having subordinated conventions 
to natural gifts and usage, he then affronts the question of the 
principles of style: 
good composition is far less dependent on acquaintance with its 
laws, than on practice and natural aptitude. A clear head, a quick 
imagination, and a sensitive ear, will go far towards making all 
rhetorical precepts needless. [ ... ] Nevertheless, some result may 
be expected from a familiarity with the principles of style. [ ... ] 
No general theory of expression seems yet to have been enun-
ciated. The maxims contained in works on composition and 
rhetoric, are presented in an unorganized form. Standing as isolated 
dogmas---as empirical generalizations, they are neither so clearly 
apprehended, nor so much respected, as they would be if they 
were deduced from simple first principle. [ ... ] But, however influ-
ential the precepts thus dogmatically expressed, they would be 
much more influential if reduced to something like scientific ordi-
nation. In this as in other cases, conviction is strengthened when 
we understand the why. And we may be sure that recognition of 
the general principle from which the rules of composition result, 
will not only bring them home to us with greater force, but will 
disclose other rules of like origin. 
On seeking for some clue to the law underlying these current 
maxims, we may see implied in many of them, the importance of 
economizing the reader's or hearer's attention. To so present ideas 
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that they may be apprehended with the least possible mental effort, 
is the desideratum towards which most of the rules above quoted 
point. 4 
Though Spencer tends to avoid the use of the word "rhetoric," 
preferring the terms "grammar" or "style," he proposes as valid 
and possible a rhetoric which is a deduction and definition of tech-
niques which will achieve an efficient use of language, working 
from scientifically based "first principles." When these principles 
are encompassed in an economy of mental effort, 5 they give rise 
to a general theory of expression which brings into play a notion 
of language as both vehicle and hindrance of thought: 
Regarding language as an apparatus of symbols for conveying 
thought, we may say that, as in a mechanical apparatus, the more 
simple, the better arranged its parts, the greater will be the effect pro-
duced. In either case, whatever force is absorbed by the machine is 
deducted from the result. [ ... ] How truly language must be re-
garded as a hindrance to thought, though the necessary instrument 
of it, we shall clearly perceive on remembering the comparative 
force with which simple ideas are communicated by signs. 6 
It is significant here that the idea of efficient use of language is 
not connected to any notion of expressive embellishment. At most, 
the efficient use of language is resolved in the extra-linguistic 
efficiency of gesture or sign. The instrumental nature of language 
with regard to thought reveals it to be not only an obstacle or 
hindrance to thought (and here lies the usefulness of clear, persua-
sive rules which may be deduced from a general theory of expres-
sion), but it also allows it to be re-absorbed into the immediate, 
simple, natural expression of gesture from which it first emerged, 
distinguishing itself in the more complicated form of language . 
Rhetoric is "naturalized" according to a theory of expression 
which continually tends to dissolve the specific linguistic element. 
Expressiveness, or expressive efficiency, is traced back to the nat-
ural condition of the gesture, and rhetoric is reduced to a pre-
existing feature which is defined in terms of emotions, sentiments 
or passions rather than in linguistic terms. Thus psychological 
factors come to be given primary importance in many late-nine-
teenth-century treatments of aesthetics. 
I. A. Richards' The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936), although never 
specifically mentioning Spencer, can be seen as a perfect antithesis 
to the "Philosophy of Style ." Richards' idea of rhetoric as the 
study of verbal ambiguities and their relative corrections is a re-
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verse image of Spencer's efficiency. 7 Richards places even further 
back in the history of rhetoric such a "fallacy" which sees only 
the problem of how to use in the best possible way the evident 
undeniable powers of expression which words already contain. 
Spencer works within a vision of language seen as a ready-made 
tool to be used in the best possible ways, while Richards' view 
of rhetoric as a study of verbal ambiguities sees the precariousness 
of words not as a casual accident in the use of language but as 
the very nature of linguistic meaning. The mechanism of metaphor 
matches the mechanism of verbal signification and has its roots 
in the theorem in which verbal meaning functions as delegated 
efficiency of omitted contexts. 
Confronting Richards' idea of rhetoric with Spencer's, rhetoric 
takes on a linguistic consistency but with respect to a linguistics 
of the signified rather than the signifier and remains within a seman-
tics still very open to psychological elements. 8 
3. Benedetto Croce's obliteration of rhetoric through the identity 
of intuition and expression postulates a clear de-psychologization 
of the idea of expression, midway between the extremes of Spencer 
and Richards. For Croce, expression is identified as a type of 
knowledge which is appropriate to the dialectics of the Spirit, as 
intuitive knowledge . As a result, it has no requirement of any 
type of psychological content . However, following Croce's argu-
ment consistently, we go beyond even this. The specific linguistic 
element is obliterated in the single legitimate science of expression, 
that is, aesthetics . For Croce, beauty is successful expression or 
simply expression. 9 
In order to fit this concept, rhetoric has to be reduced to the 
simulacrum of the "double form." 10 Once rhetoric has been re-
duced to the theory of decorated expression, and seen as merely 
an embellished re-elaboration of simple expressions, it can then 
be governed and obliterated by the identity of intuition and expres-
sion. While Spencer naturalized rhetoric in the context of psycho-
physical expressiveness, Croce annuls it in the conceptual device 
of a theoretical category. In both cases the idea of rhetoric is 
reduced to the idea of a technique for treating a verbal material 
which already exists or is otherwise accessible. In both cases lan-
guage moves away towards something other than itself, be it 
immediate natural expression in the one case or an all-inclusive 
totalizing mechanism of the identity of the categories of intuition 
and expression in the other . 
The understanding of rhetoric against which Croce's position 
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stands and reacts is thus a naturalized rhetoric reduced in the 
combination of, in Spencer's terms, grammar and style. However, 
another annulment of rhetoric is also offered in the same period 
which is very different from Croce's position. To name but one 
among several contrasting speculations on rhetoric at this time, 
Michelstaedter offers a very different view. 11 For Michelstaedter, 
the illusory nature of rhetoric is a result of the impossibility of 
persuasion, the impossibility of possessing ourselves and our own 
life. He makes an analogy with weight which, always striving to 
reach a lower level, "is itself an impediment to possessing its own 
life and depends only on itself in the fact that it can do nothing 
but fall, it has no possibility of resisting its situation. Weight can 
never be persuaded. "12 Rhetorical illusion covers and hides the 
impossible possession of truth. 
4. When criticizing the dogmatic rules of traditional ideas of 
rhetoric, Croce has often been assigned a liberating influence and 
his position hailed as one which affirmed the creative liberty of 
art in contrast to the confines and rules of rhetoric. This view 
belongs clearly to the romantic tradition and is of no particular 
interest here. It is more interesting to observe how, at the turn 
of the century, positions of normative rhetoric were explicitly 
re-proposed and to note the reactions these aroused in the climate 
of "psychological rhetoric." In France, an interesting example of 
this debate can be found in the dispute between A. Albalat, author 
of L' Art d' ecrire enseigne en vingt lerons, 13 and Remy de Gourmont. 
At the end of the nineteenth century in France, many scholars 
turned their attention to rhetoric, particularly due to the institu-
tional changes which occurred in 1885 when the teaching of 
rhetoric was abolished in favor of "summary notions of the History 
of Greek, Latin and French Literatures." A.-Ed. Chaignet, for 
example, opened his La Rhetorique et son histoire, written at the 
turn of the century, 14 with the call for a systematic study of liter-
ature for the education and exercise of taste. The cultural climate 
was marked by a sense of the beautiful and an aesthetic taste, the 
belief in a literary value existing in a timeless dimension which 
governs history. Literature was considered superior to History of 
Literature. A contribution of Brunetiere to this line of reasoning 
offers more carefully articulated and less diaphanous motivations 
for the necessity to which rhetoric responds: "It is for oneself but 
also for others that one writes and speaks. "15 Thus literature and 
art have a social mission to express and they show the worth of 
the communal word "which comes from the heart of our fellow 
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beings and reaches into our own heart," for "We cannot live by 
bread, algebra and exegesis alone. "16 
The call was for a normative rhetoric, if by this is understood 
a reasoned system of timeless laws and rules for language and 
thought as general, universal concerns of humanity. Such a theory 
of rhetoric was considered by many to be a didactic, pedagogical, 
even political necessity in France in this period. 
Albalat has a much less ambitious and far-reaching objective, 
but is quite precise in his belief in efficiency. 17 He defends stoically 
the teachability of the art of writing and the concer,t of literature 
as a trade which can be learned and praci.iced like any other. 
Albalat's writings blend a monumental respect for "Literature" 
and "Great Writers" with a cast-iron faith in the teaching of 
techniques and the analysis of the trade through the study of the 
masters and their works. For Albalat, reflection takes first place 
as part of the work which modifies inspiration and spontanei7 
word by word: "You are not born original, you become original. "1 
However, the most interesting aspect of Albalat's work for 
our survey is the reaction it caused in Remy de Gourmont with 
respect to the concept of style . The crux of their dispute is this: 
while Albalat puts forward the idea that expressive facts stem not 
from "emotions" but from "will" by means of a conscious and 
conscientious process of work, Gourmont states that "style is a 
specialization of sensibility." 19 Such a definition stems from the 
theme of the psyche-physical unity of human beings, that is, of 
the continuity between the physiological and the psychological. 
This theme appears also in Spencer, and his "The Origin and 
Function of Music" 20 should be read in conjunction with "The 
Philosophy of Style" in this respect. For Spencer, music starts 
from the voice, from the physiological response to an emotion. 
The voice contains all the elements-tone, pitch, etc.-which the 
evolution of music has been concerned with discovering, gather-
ing and condensing to use systematically . 
The investigations of creative mechanisms springing from the 
idea of psycho-physical unity of the mind and the continuity be-
tween brain and thought move the understanding of rhetoric into 
the context of a psychology of invention . 21 There are many exam-
ples of this progression. Hennequin's La Critique Scientifique,22 for 
example, proposes a model in which an initial aesthetic analysis, 
directed towards the discovery of the particular emotion produced 
by that emotion-producing machine, the work of art, is followed 
by a psychological analysis which sets out to find the equivalent 
structure to the mechanisms operating in the work of art in the 
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mind of the author. Lacombe's Introduction a l'histoire litteraire23 
suggests as the central mechanism of literary invention a psychol-
ogy of the writer consisting of the sequence sensibility-memory-
imagination-emotion-to-be-communicated. Lacombe also draws 
attention to an element diametrically opposed to the methodological 
psychologism which dominates his theory in general. This element 
is also expressed in the language of psychology, using the concept 
of suggestion. 24 The ability of expression of a poet or writer depends 
not on a "special" sensitivity but rather on a more highly developed 
"record of an emotion" which is substantially a "language record." 
A poet feels his or her own emotions and contemporaneously thinks 
about them (thus linguistically recording them); when the emotion-
to-be-communicated is expressed, inspiration-that is, the wish to 
communicate emotions--is fed through the auto-suggestion to the 
verbal sign. Thus the expressive moment feeds back to the emotion-
to-be-communicated. 25 This emphasis on the linguistic dimension 
finds its outcome in Lacombe in specific attention to rhetorical figures 
and in a reclassification of these figures whereby rhetoric is seen 
almost as the language of the psychology of invention. 26 
s. The split in the understanding of style which appears between 
the totalizing position of psychologistic reduction and the indepen-
dent, irreducible strength of the linguistic dimension becomes even 
wider in Gourmont. Gourmont is immovable in his conviction that 
style is part of the psycho ·physiological condition of human beings: 
Style cannot be taught. It is completely futile to talk of the pedagogical 
aspects of the question. The real problem of style is a matter of physi-
ology. [ ... ] We write as we feel, as we think, with the whole of our 
body. Intelligence is only one of the modes of being of sensibility 
and it is certainly neither the most stable nor the most voluntary. 27 
Gourmont cites Buffon' s maxim that "Le style c' est l'homme" as 
"the affirmation of a naturalist, one who knows that bird songs are 
determined by the shape of the beak, the form of the tongue and 
the size of the throat and lungs. The question of style concerns 
grammarians only if th~ are prepared to work from solid psycho-
physiological notions." Gourmont's views on philosophy repeat 
once again his belief that style is produced by the total act of writing, 
not merely by a surface verbal layer: "what is a doctrine, if not the 
verbal translation of a physiology?" 29 
Thus if style is a specialization of sensibility, all style must 
be involuntary. This physiological interpretation effectively pre-
cludes any role for education and instruction. In response to the 
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"professors of sociology" who have invented the idea of mentality, 
Gourmont states firmly that the brain is all or nothing, quoting 
Taine who had said that "the brain secretes thought just as the 
liver secretes bile." 30 Within this absolute physiologization of style, 
however, there appears an unsettling idea of literature whereby 
all art and literature and every social or cultural creation depends 
on the primary and primordial faculty of the lie. Gourmont sees 
the lie in terms of an opposition in physiological terms for it is 
what can be opposed to imitation, or the animal-type camouflage 
as an adaptation to the environment. Gourmont's idea of lie is 
revealed in his counter-opposition of Homer and Flaubert. 
Homer's precision is incapable of lying while Flaubert has an 
infinite ability in lying and provides his readers not with the exact 
sensation but with the confusion, which is visually absurd yet 
artistically admirable, of a "double et trouble" sensation. 31 
Trouble is the key word in Gourmont's "physiology," which 
is repeatedly and confusedly redoubled in any necessity and task, 
in any logic and any event. If there is a linear, consequential circuit 
which moves from sensations to word-images, to word-ideas, to 
word-feelings, this closed circuit is reactivated by the tendency 
of feelings to pass into action, which is in turn the source of our 
strongest and most acute sensations. However, "this resembles 
closely (perhaps too closely) the circulation of the blood. Les 
troubles of the circulation of ideas produce literature, art, games, 
culture." 32 With our "synaesthetic" tendencies we are closer to 
Flaubert than to Homer because we cannot separate the double 
or triple images which simultaneously arise when we think of a 
fact, in our brains troubles by tumultuous sensations. 33 Finally, for 
Flaubert, the true hero of Gourmont's study (at crucial points in 
the argument Gourmont adds a quotation from Bouvard et 
Pecuchet), the necessity of this trouble physiology becomes an active 
task: 
No matter what school he had been trained in, Flaubert would 
have become what he was, himself. Life is a filtering. Man's task 
in life is to clean his personality, to flush out all the waste products 
deposited there by education and to free it from all traces left there 
by what he admired as an adolescent. 34 
6. The dispute between Albalat and Gourmont may stand as an 
emblem of a conflict between a normative rhetoric and a 
naturalized rhetoric in which a notion of style is germinated and 
transplanted into a new field. Gourmont's aversion to normative 
rhetoric is not an aversion to a scheme of rhetoric in and by itself, 35 
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but rather to a pedagogical role for rhetoric. For Gourmont and 
his idea of physiology, the intended receiver of such a pedagogical 
role does not exist, for humanity is something else entirely. What 
can be produced by means of a rhetorical training or instruction 
has nothing to do with art. These are problems which, although 
more basic and less soul-searching, are nonetheless close to those 
outlined by Michelstaedter. In the early years of the present cen-
tury there are many reappearances of such themes, with frequent 
echoes of Nietzsche, turned to the subject of rhetoric with dis-
courses on being, truth and language. 36 
Once rhetoric has moved away from the idea of a normative 
system, it can develop in the context of the discussion and concept 
of style which may be found in many central areas of contemporary 
culture. The concern with style forms a dense interweaving of 
motivations and methodologies which cannot be adequately con-
tained under the simple heading of "stylistics." The notion of 
distortion represents perhaps the most characteristic indication of 
the complexity and richness of the present situation. Once norma-
tive ideas have been abandoned, the conceptual mechanism of 
the idea of a norm (with its latent content of deviation and trans-
gression of the norm, of distortion) becomes available for use in 
considering the validity, the possibility of legitimization and the 
practicability of a new idea of style. This is important for at least 
one reason. In Langue et techniques poetiques a l' epoque romane, 37 
Paul Zumthor entitled one of his chapters "L' ecart rhetorique" 
and was careful to attribute the source of the term to Valery. This 
seems to me to demonstrate quite clearly that the cultural vitality 
of the idea of distortion, or ecart, is not only due to the interest of 
linguists and theorists of stylistics but also to the fact that the idea 
draws on one of the principal currents of twentieth-century poetry, 
on what Valery defined as pure and absolute poetry. 31J 
While Richards' The Philosophy of Rhetoric tended to resolve 
rhetoric into semantics and a linguistics of the signified which 
privileged the idea of ambiguity, 39 the problems and internal crises 
of the supporters of psychologism gave rise, through the re-
sponses of opposition which these provoked at the beginning of 
this century, to a stylistic rhetoric which was more concerned with 
a linguistics of the signifier and which gave prime importance to 
the idea of distortion. It is quite possible to read Roman Jakobson's 
famous article on "Linguistics and Poetics" as an attempt to sum-
marize and to crystallize in a scientific manner-working from a 
linguistics of functions-the ideas of distortion and ambiguity.40 
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7. What do these fragments from the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century offer us for an understanding of rhetoric? They 
range from a pedagogy of style which has its last line of resistance 
in using the works of the masters as exemplars, to theories of a 
psycho-physiology of style which both absorbs and rejects ideas 
laid down by a naturalized rhetoric. Their varying elements and 
intentions of meaning reveal an illuminating series of problems, a 
referent of signification [referente di significazione] for that variegated 
tendency in nineteenth-century culture which gathers up rhetor-
ical terms and concepts, and brings them together in the idea of 
style [ tema dello stile]. 
Let us turn once again to the passage from Banfi quoted at 
the beginning of this article. While Banfi's emphasis on rhetoric 
cannot be simply explained in its general methodological move-
ment as an opportunistic attack on Croce's views, neither can it 
be satisfactorily inserted in the ideas of rhetoric outlined above . 
For Banfi, rhetoric seems to be operating closer to the idea of 
tradition rather than to the idea of style. 
The idea of tradition is not entirely incompatible with a nor-
mative rhetoric, of course. However, normative rhetoric often has 
the tendency to confuse and obscure the idea of tradition by pre-
suming it to be a set of values which can then be applied. This 
confusion appears in the above-mentioned work of Brunetiere, 
"Apologie pour la rhetorique," which concludes with the argu-
ment against the substitution of rhetoric by literary history, in the 
name of the project of "classical French teaching." Since classical 
French literature is essentially oratorical ("our greatest writers did 
not see themselves write: they felt writing" 41 ), rhetoric has an un-
deniable historical-exegetical necessity. Although in this instance 
Brunetiere' s argument is couched in terms suitable for a discussion 
of school curriculum and pedagogy, elsewhere he uses a more 
elevated sphere of reference when he states that a "classical" 
literature is conceivable only because of the universality of values 
which it represents. Thus the intended recipient of the pedagogical 
force is not merely pupils in the classroom but is the whole of 
humanity. It is needless to state that such ideas stood little chance 
of acceptance or survival against the turbulent views of the follow-
ing century. 
Leaving aside pedagogic presumptions and normative asser-
tions of values, the idea of tradition takes on new life as a means 
of questioning the present, and of ways of going about things in 
the present . 
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The importance of Valery with respect to the idea of distortion 
was pointed out above, but another equally influential poet may 
be called upon here. In T. S. Eliot's study "Tradition and the 
Individual Talent" (1920), t_he conditions of creating poetry are 
examined. Eliot turns his attention to the need, for the poet, of a 
historical sense which is "a sense of the timeless as well as of the 
temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together. "42 
According to Eliot: 
The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves, 
which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) 
work of art among them. The existing order is complete before the 
new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of 
novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, al-
tered .... 43 
The past is renewed by the present as the present is supported 
by the past. The poet must therefore undergo a permanent extinc-
tion of personality, the poet must "surrender himself wholly to the 
work to be done." 44 We are a long way here from style seen as a 
"specialization of sensibility." 
Anceschi moves on from this idea in Eliot of tradition as a 
changing order and sees in Husserl the idea that the past, or what 
is considered finished and set, a past which is silent and mul-
tilayered, can be remade and can be made into the present in 
relation to a future horizon, which exists as an intentional prospec-
tive.45 However, if it is the future, as a project of doing, which 
enables the past to be made present, the present life of the past 
is possible because the linking up of comprehension occurs within 
the unity of the community of communication. It is realized within 
the framework of language as an intersubjective mediation, lan-
guage not as a mere exchange of information but as a connection 
in a community for which the setting of spoken language in writing 
guarantees both a continuity and a continuation. 
A word (a work of art) is not alive simply because it has the 
quality of an authentic event (there are many possible modes of 
authenticity : coincidence with the a priori synthesis intuition-
expression, being rooted in the integral totality of human being, 
etc.), but rather because it continues and lasts in the intersubjective 
intentional work of language, of the community and of the human 
possibility of projecting from the present. Such an idea of tradition 
gives rise to an attention to objective structures of the work of art 
itself, objective structures understood not as facts which can be 
reduced scientifically to validity with any preexistent discipline, 
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but as structures which are objective in the sense of having a 
quality of lasting intention which cannot but outlive them. 
8. The explicit idea of a rhetoric is taken up again in that more 
intensive movement in considering the work of art which finds 
its realization in the notion of poetics. The first and most general 
sense of poetics lies in the desire to move reflection on art outside 
of an exclusive, petrified, philosophical methodology and to re-
cognize the multiplicity of modes and levels and the different 
intentions which go to make up the work of art. Above all, poetics 
displays the intimate and inescapable connection between art and 
knowledge of art; poetics is also the poet's reflection on the craft 
of poetry, it is not a secondary activity which is carried out around 
the work of art but is an intention of sense which penetrates the 
work and is active in its structure. It is not an ideal or mental 
anticipation of the work of art but an active principle which inti-
mately guides the very construction of the work of art. 
It follows, therefore, that there is no work of art (object, event 
or experience which we consider to belong to the cultural sphere 
"art") that does not contain a thread of reflection on art in its 
structure. Anceschi has shown in his analysis of the notion of 
literary "institutions" that these are "a certain idea of principles 
created for doing, a certain plan of rules," 46 which lead to an area 
of pragmatic reflection. Thus what we enclose in the idea of poetics 
is both an intrinsic moment of art in the process of being made and the 
indication of a possible discourse and knowledge of art. . 
This is the area in which this phenomenology of art rediscovers 
the relevance of rhetoric. It i~ when we work to build an image 
of the complexity of the work of art, which includes the objectivity 
of its structures, the intentionality of its project and the relation-
ship between these two terms, that rhetoric reappears as an institu-
tional framework and as a field of possibility of the work of art-
naturally in the overlapping, the shifting, the layering and the 
interference with other frameworks and other possibilities. 
Such a reappearance of rhetoric was earlier termed the idea of 
tradition not because it was intended to allude to something alive 
in the past which needed to be considered in order to understand 
that past nor even to indicate some improbable canon of essential 
values, but because rhetoric provides a crucial example of how 
"tradition" is an inevitable idea in any present which projects its 
own future, in the apparently minimal and inert everyday detail 
of doing things. E. R. Curtius noted with magisterial simplicity 
that: "Where literature is a school subject we have elements of a 
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systematized study of literature. "47 Similar appeals to the more 
humble, blind or even mechanical dealing with literary works 
begins a wealth of somewhat more fruitful theoretical suggestions 
made by many recent developments in the "theory" and "science" 
of literature. 
Finally, if we are working within the framework of the struc-
tured work of poetics, pragmatic reflection, which is an intrinsic 
moment of art and an element in the knowledge of art, will give 
rise to the need for theoretical clarification. Theoretical should be 
understood here in the plural sense of theories, different ways 
and levels of grouping and solving problems. This clarification 
will produce a discourse on art in which we shall also be speaking, 
diversely but exhaustively, about something other than art. In this 
way, the rhetoric used in such a discourse will not be a rhetoric 
of the "restricted" kind but will be shown in the full breadth of 
its cultural spread, demonstrating relevance and usefulness in 
many areas and directions of knowledge and applicable to many 
widely differing forms and problems of cultural life. 
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